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The Constitutional Limits of the “National 
Consensus” Doctrine in Eighth Amendment 
Jurisprudence 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Should Congress be able to unilaterally determine the 
constitutionality of a criminal sentence under the Eighth 
Amendment? Moreover, should Congress be able to override the 
Supreme Court’s judgment that a particular criminal punishment is 
unconstitutional without amending the Constitution?  
Presumably, the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment 
were adopted with the intention of imposing an outer limit on what 
kinds of actions legislatures may take against individuals. In 
particular, the Eighth Amendment limits legislative discretion by 
prohibiting the imposition of “cruel and unusual punishments” by 
state and federal legislatures.1 However, as some scholars have 
argued, the U.S. Supreme Court may have already vested Congress 
and state legislatures with the power to independently dictate 
whether a particular punishment is permissible under the Eighth 
Amendment.2 
Although the text of the Eighth Amendment provides little 
guidance as to which particular punishments are unconstitutional,3 
the Supreme Court has made clear that the Amendment prohibits 
(1) certain modes of punishment, such as torture,4 and (2) 
punishments that are grossly disproportionate or excessive.5 This 
latter category has comprised the majority of cases giving rise to the 
 
 1. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. This Amendment now applies to the states through the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666–
67 (1962). 
 2. See infra Part II.B. 
 3. See GREG ROZA, THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT: PREVENTING CRUEL AND UNUSUAL 
PUNISHMENT 26–27 (1st ed. 2011) (noting that the Amendment does not specify which 
particular punishments are prohibited and that some of the Founding Fathers perceived the 
Eighth Amendment as “too vague to be truly effective”). 
 4. See Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 135–37 (1878). 
 5. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311 n.7 (2002) (stating that the Eighth 
Amendment proscribes “all excessive punishments”); see also Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 
2011, 2021 (2010). 
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Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.6 In determining 
which sentences are unconstitutionally excessive, the Court has 
adopted two approaches for reviewing disproportionality challenges.7 
First, for the majority of noncapital crimes, the Court has utilized 
a “gross disproportionality” analysis.8 Essentially, this approach 
consists of judges weighing the seriousness of an offense against the 
seriousness of the punishment, so as to determine whether the 
penalty is unconstitutionally excessive.9 
Second, the Court has used a “categorical” approach that 
implements bright-line rules to prohibit certain sentencing 
practices.10 This approach differs from the gross-disproportionality 
method because, rather than requiring judges to subjectively weigh 
the proportionality of a sentence, the Court simply creates black-
letter rules that dictate the specific applications of the Eighth 
Amendment. While most cases implicating the categorical approach 
have dealt with capital punishment,11 the Court has recently applied 
this method to a noncapital case,12 suggesting that the categorical 
approach may now be utilized in both capital and noncapital cases.13 
The categorical approach consists of a two-part analysis. First, the 
Court considers “‘objective indicia of society’s standards, as 
expressed in legislative enactments and state practice’ to determine 
 
 6. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2021 (“For the most part . . . the Court’s precedents 
consider punishments challenged not as inherently barbaric but as disproportionate to the 
crime.”). The prohibition on disproportionate punishments serves the fundamental “precept of 
justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to [the] offense.” See 
also Robinson, 370 U.S. at 666–67. 
 7. See infra Part II.B. 
 8. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2021–22 (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 
1005 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring)). 
 9. See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1005 (Kennedy, J., concurring). If this initial weighing 
gives rise to an inference of “gross disproportionality,” the Court will then compare the 
sentence with those imposed in the same and other jurisdictions for similar and other crimes. 
Id. Importantly, the Court has stated that this analysis “does not require strict proportionality 
between crime and sentence” but “forbids only extreme sentences that are ‘grossly 
disproportionate’ to the crime.” Id. at 1001 (quoting Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 288 
(1983)). See also LYNN S. BRANHAM, THE LAW AND POLICY OF SENTENCING AND 
CORRECTIONS IN A NUTSHELL 168, 177–78 (8th ed. 2010) (noting that there is no concrete 
method of applying gross-disproportionality review). 
 10. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2022. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. at 2022–23. 
 13. Interestingly, the Court’s expansion of the categorical approach into the noncapital 
context suggests that the Court might combine the gross disproportionality and categorical 
modes of analysis. 
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whether there is a national consensus against the sentencing practice 
at issue.”14 In other words, the Court first considers state and federal 
legislation to determine if there is a national consensus against 
implementing a particular sentencing practice. Second, the Court 
considers “the Court’s own understanding and interpretation of the 
Eighth Amendment’s text, history, meaning, and purpose.”15 This 
second part of the analysis has been deemed the “independent 
judgment” analysis, and has historically complemented the national 
consensus rationale to help the Court determine whether a particular 
sentencing practice violates the Eighth Amendment.16 Using these 
methodologies in complementary fashion, the Court has been able 
to determine whether particular sentencing practices violate the 
Eighth Amendment.17 
Recently, however, the dual relationship between the national 
consensus and independent judgment rationales has become 
unclear,18 prompting onlookers to wonder which of the two methods 
should predominate whenever they point to different outcomes. 
Some scholars have argued that in Kennedy v. Louisiana,19 this issue 
was decided as the national consensus rationale became the primary 
basis for the Court’s holding.20 Because of this, scholars have argued 
that the holding in Kennedy should be subject to legislative override, 
since new legislation would indicate a different national consensus.21 
By implication, then, these scholars seem to suggest that if the Court 
utilizes the national consensus rationale as its primary methodology 
in future categorical Eighth Amendment cases, then such decisions 
 
 14. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2022 (emphasis added) (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 
U.S. 551, 572 (2005)). 
 15. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 421 (2008) (emphasis added). 
 16. See, e.g., Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2022 (explaining that the Court has traditionally 
considered both the “national consensus” and “independent judgment” approaches in 
complementary fashion within the categorical review context). 
 17. See infra Part II.A. 
 18. See infra Part II.B–C. 
 19. Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 407. 
 20. See Richard M. Ré, Can Congress Overturn Kennedy v. Louisiana?, 33 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 1031, 1036 (2010) (arguing that subsequent federal legislation should render 
Kennedy “at least partially subject to democratic override”); David A. Strauss, The Modernizing 
Mission of Judicial Review, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 859, 868 (2009) (suggesting that Kennedy 
could be overridden by an alliance of state legislation). 
 21. See Akhil Reed Amar, Foreward: The Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. 
REV. 26, 124 n.330 (2000) (arguing that large-scale adoption of new state legislation could 
prompt the Court to reconsider prior holdings); Ré, supra note 20, at 1036; Strauss, supra 
note 20, at 868. 
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would be vulnerable to federal or state legislative override. As yet, 
the Court has not officially encountered a case in which it was willing 
to openly recognize that the two rationales lead to blatantly different 
outcomes.22 Consequently, it is currently unclear exactly what the 
Court’s approach will be when this conflict occurs. Eventually, 
however, the Court will be forced to choose which of the two 
rationales should take primacy over the other. 
This Comment argues that the Court should adopt its 
independent judgment rationale as the primary method for analysis 
in categorical Eighth Amendment review. This is because a national 
consensus-only approach would grant legislatures an impermissibly 
broad power to define the contours of the Constitution. More 
specifically, a national consensus-only approach would essentially 
undermine the policies that gave rise to adoption of the Eighth 
Amendment.23 Part II reviews the history and development of the 
national consensus and independent judgment rationales, including a 
review of the breakdown of their complementary relationship in 
Kennedy and Graham. Part III discusses some major constitutional 
problems that would result if the national consensus rationale takes 
precedence in Eighth Amendment review. Part IV argues that the 
Court should utilize the independent judgment rationale as its 
ultimate analytical tool and demote the national consensus rationale 
to secondary status. Part V concludes. 
II. HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE NATIONAL CONSENSUS 
AND INDEPENDENT JUDGMENT RATIONALES 
In an effort to give more specific meaning to the Eighth 
Amendment, the Court has stated that the meaning of “cruel and 
unusual punishment”24 is to be determined by looking to 
contemporary norms.25 More generally, courts determine the 
 
 22. However, in Graham v. Florida, the Court was willing to skew its national 
consensus analysis in order to make it coherent with its independent judgment analysis. See 
infra Part II.C; see also Richard M. Ré, Can Congress Overturn Graham v. Florida?, 34 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 367, 370 (2011) (noting that the Court in Graham modified its traditional 
national consensus analysis because it seemed to be “motivated primarily by its independent 
judgment analysis”). 
 23. See infra Part III. 
 24. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
 25. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311 (2002) (stating that the Eighth Amendment 
is to be understood “not by the standards that prevailed . . . when the Bill of Rights was 
adopted, but rather by those that currently prevail”). 
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constitutionality of a punishment in part by looking to “evolving 
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”26 
This is because “[t]he standard of extreme cruelty is not merely 
descriptive, but necessarily embodies a moral judgment. The 
standard itself remains the same, but its applicability must change as 
the basic mores of society change.”27 Implicit within this principle is 
the premise that society’s moral judgment progresses with time. 
Therefore, by looking to contemporary norms, courts can better 
determine whether a particular sentencing practice constitutes “cruel 
and unusual punishment.”28 
However, the Court also noted early on that contemporary views 
on sentencing practices would not alone be determinative, because 
the Court should itself inquire into the limits of the Eighth 
Amendment.29 Therefore, the Court has made clear that the 
constitutionality of a particular sentencing practice would have to be 
measured by current societal views and Court-implemented 
principles. Thus, even before the Court created the modern 
“national consensus” and “independent judgment” rationales, it 
applied precursors of these methods in earlier Eighth Amendment 
cases.30 
As the dual approach to categorical Eighth Amendment review 
developed, however, the precursors to the national consensus and 
independent judgment rationales underwent serious change. Not 
only did the content of each rationale change over time, but the 
relationship between the two methods became muddled.31 While the 
Court was able to use the two rationales in complementary fashion  
 
throughout the twentieth century,32 eventually tensions arose 
between the two methods in Kennedy and Graham.33 
A. The Early Complementary Nature of the National Consensus and 
 
 26. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion). 
 27. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 419 (2008) (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 
U.S. 238, 382 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting)). 
 28. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
 29. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (noting that in addition to 
considering societal views, “[a] penalty also must accord with ‘the dignity of man’” (quoting 
Trop, 356 U.S. at 100 (plurality opinion))). 
 30. See, e.g., id. 
 31. See infra Part II.B–C. 
 32. See infra Part II.A. 
 33. See infra Part II.B–C. 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2012 
1372 
Independent Judgment Rationales 
Although the inception of the modern national consensus and 
independent judgment rationales is fairly recent,34 their roots were 
already laid by the mid-twentieth century.35 At that time, the Court 
used a dual-methodology approach for categorical review, looking 
first to “evolving standards of decency” and then to Eighth 
Amendment purposes.36 However, the Court initially applied this 
method by considering national or state legislation as only one factor 
among many in determining “evolving standards of decency.”37 
For example, in Gregg v. Georgia, the Court attempted to 
demonstrate society’s “evolving standards of decency” regarding the 
permissibility of the death penalty.38 The Court measured public 
attitudes by considering a variety of factors in addition to state 
legislation.39 These various factors, among others, included the text 
of the Constitution, historical acceptance of capital punishment, and 
empirical data reflecting public opinion.40 The Court used all of 
these indicia to demonstrate that imposition of the death penalty 
comported with society’s evolving conceptions of morality.41 
In addition, the Court in Gregg independently considered the 
purposes of the Eighth Amendment and whether they could be 
served by capital punishment.42 In that case, the Court determined 
that the death penalty did not necessarily constitute the “unnecessary 
and wanton infliction of pain,”43 as it often served important 
 
 34. See Ré, supra note 20, at 1039 (noting that it was only in the recent cases of 
“Atkins, Roper, and Kennedy . . . [that] a unique type of right with a distinct[] jurisprudential 
basis [was created]. What unites these cases and the rights they create is a common 
methodology organized around two concepts: ‘national consensus’ and the Court’s 
‘independent judgment.’”). 
 35. See, e.g., Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101–04 (1958) (plurality opinion). 
 36. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (quoting Trop, 356 U.S. at 101) 
(noting that the Court looks to both “evolving standards of decency” and the limits implicit 
within the “the dignity of man,” which limits formed the primary purpose behind the Eighth 
Amendment); see also id. at 176–87 (applying the two methods noted above). 
 37. Id. at 176–82. 
 38. See id. at 176–87. 
 39. Id. at 176–82; see also BRANHAM, supra note 9, at 144–45. 
 40. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 177–82. 
 41. See id. 
 42. See id. at 182–83 (“The Court also must ask whether [the death penalty] comports 
with the basic concept of human dignity at the core of the Amendment,” and that a sanction 
“cannot be . . . totally without penological justification”). 
 43. Id. at 173. 
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penological justifications.44 The Court also determined that it was 
not excessively disproportionate per se, at least not for the crime of 
murder.45 In the end, the Court emphasized that its upholding of 
the death penalty was based both on a measurement of public 
attitudes and on jurisprudential principles.46 
However, with the advent of the twenty-first century, the Court 
modified its approach in Atkins v. Virginia and Roper v. Simmons by 
implementing the modern “national consensus” and “independent 
judgment” rationales for categorical review.47 While the Court 
utilized the same basic dual-method of analysis, it modified the two 
rationales in significant ways. In Atkins, the Court first used the 
“national consensus” rationale by looking to state and federal 
legislative practices as the sole criterion for measuring public norms.48 
This was because the Court argued that “the clearest and most 
reliable objective evidence of contemporary values is the legislation 
enacted by the country’s legislatures.”49 
In addition, these cases also differed because the Court stated 
that recent legislative “trends” would also be relevant to the national 
consensus analysis, even when such trends do not involve a majority 
of jurisdictions.50 In other words, recent legislation from multiple 
states is relevant, even if such legislation does not involve a majority 
of states. Last, the Court indicated that actual sentencing practices, 
and not just legislation itself, could inform the national consensus 
analysis.51 In both Atkins and Roper, however, it seemed clear that 
the Court primarily focused on sentencing legislation as the primary 
indicator of a national consensus, with legislative trends and actual 
sentencing practices playing only a supplementary role.52 
After finding a national consensus against the sentencing 
 
 44. Id. at 183–86. 
 45. Id. at 187. 
 46. Id. at 173. 
 47. See Ré, supra note 20, at 1039. 
 48. See id. at 1042–43 (noting that Atkins and Roper were the first cases to invoke the 
phrase “‘national consensus’—a term that does not appear in other strands of Eighth 
Amendment doctrine”). 
 49. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312 (2002) (citing Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 
302, 331 (1989)). 
 50. Id. at 315 (“It is not so much the number of these States that is significant, but the 
consistency of the direction of change.”). 
 51. Id. at 316. 
 52. See Ré, supra note 22, at 368 (implying that legislation statistics were primary, and 
that Graham’s focus on “the deliberateness of legislation” constituted a “new focus”). 
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practices at issue in both cases, the Court also noted that its own 
independent judgment would be brought to bear in determining the 
constitutionality of the sentences in question.53 In performing this 
analysis, the Court relied on common-sense principles to draw 
distinctions between mentally challenged, juvenile, and other 
offenders.54 Through this analysis, the Court identified reasons why 
juveniles and mentally challenged offenders were less culpable than 
typical adult offenders. The Court also assessed the permissibility of 
the death penalty for these kinds of offenders in light of the 
penological theories of retribution and deterrence.55 Because these 
theories did not sufficiently support imposition of the death penalty, 
the Court found that the sentencing practices in both cases violated 
the Eighth Amendment.56 
Importantly, while the Court had modernized the dual-rationale 
categorical approach in Atkins and Roper, it continued to use the 
two rationales in complementary fashion. At that point, no tension 
had yet become apparent between the separate methods, as they had 
both always supported similar outcomes. 
B. Complementary No More—The Arguable Primacy of National 
Consensus in Kennedy v. Louisiana 
In 2008, the Court arguably elevated the national consensus 
rationale to primary status in Kennedy v. Louisiana.57 In that case, 
the Court held that the imposition of the death penalty for the crime 
of child rape violated the Eighth Amendment where the victim was 
not killed or intended to be killed.58 While the Kennedy opinion 
seemed to give considerable weight to both the national consensus 
 
 53. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564 (2005); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317. 
 54. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–70 (arguing that juvenile offenders have less culpability 
than typical adult offenders because of their youth and immaturity); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318 
(noting that mentally challenged offenders have less culpability than typical offenders because 
of their diminished capacities). 
 55. Roper, 543 U.S. at 571–72; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318–19. The Atkins Court 
determined that the punishment did not serve the purposes of retribution, since it cannot be 
defended that the most serious and extreme criminal penalty can justly be applied to offenders 
with significantly diminished culpability. Id. at 319–20. Interestingly, the Court also 
considered the existence of an international consensus against imposing capital punishment on 
minors, noting that the United States “now stands alone in a world that has turned its face 
against the juvenile death penalty.” Roper, 543 U.S. at 577. 
 56. Roper, 543 U.S. at 578; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321. 
 57. 554 U.S. 407 (2008). 
 58. Id. at 421. 
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and independent judgment rationales, post-decision events led some 
scholars to argue that the national consensus rationale was the 
primary basis for the Court’s holding.59 
In the Kennedy opinion, the Court surveyed legislation from 
around the country, finding that forty-four of the fifty states, as well 
as Congress, did not permit capital punishment for child rape.60 
Furthermore, the Court did not find sufficient evidence supporting a 
new trend in support of the sentencing practice.61 The Court also 
found that Louisiana had been the only state since 1964 that had 
actually sentenced an offender to death for child rape.62 
Consequently, the Court easily concluded that a strong national 
consensus existed against Louisiana’s sentencing practice.63 
Afterward, the Court implemented its independent judgment 
rationale and again concluded that capital punishment for child rape 
was impermissible.64 The Court first recognized its long-held policy 
of confining the death penalty to only the most serious crimes.65 In 
keeping with this policy, the Court determined that the death 
penalty “should not be expanded to instances where the victim’s life 
was not taken.”66 Additionally, the Court determined that capital 
punishment for child rape did not serve retribution or deterrence 
purposes sufficiently to warrant continuation of the practice.67 
 
 59. See infra notes 64–70 and accompanying text. 
 60. Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 423. 
 61. Id. at 431. Specifically, the Court refused to find a directional change in trend 
merely based on state legislation that had been proposed but not yet enacted. See id. at 431–
32. In addition, it did not find that the six states that had enacted capital penalties for child 
rape constituted a change in direction sufficient to outweigh the countervailing state and 
national legislation statistics. See id. at 432–33. 
 62. Id. at 434. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 434–46. 
 65. See id. at 437, 446. 
 66. Id. In this, the Court drew a clear line of separation between the seriousness of a 
typical violent crime and those that result in the death of the victim. Id. at 438. However, the 
Court did leave open the possibility of capital punishment for special crimes against the State. 
Id. at 437. 
 67. See id. at 441–46. In this, the Court found that capital punishment did not 
adequately serve the purposes of retribution, as the sentence punished the offender more than 
what he deserved because he did not take the life of the victim and because evidentiary 
problems accompany child rape cases. Id. at 441–44. The Court also found that capital 
punishment in that context did not serve deterrence purposes because such crimes often 
involve family members who risk not reporting the conduct because the penalty for the 
offender is so great. The Court also supported this conclusion by noting that criminal 
offenders often do not behave rationally. Id. at 444–46. 
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Therefore, the opinion seemed to conclude on both national 
consensus and independent judgment grounds that capital 
punishment for child rape violated the Eighth Amendment.68 
After hearing the case, however, the respondents discovered that 
they had overlooked a 2006 amendment to the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice, which permitted capital punishment for child rape.69 
Upon discovering this, the State of Louisiana and the U.S. Solicitor 
General asked the Court to rehear the case, “arguing that the 
‘national consensus’ that the Court had relied on did not in fact 
exist.”70 The Court denied the request for rehearing, with a majority 
of the justices arguing that the federal statute did not actually 
indicate a lack of national consensus within the civilian context: 
That the Manual for Courts–Martial retains the death penalty for 
rape of a child or an adult when committed by a member of the 
military does not draw into question our conclusions that there is a 
consensus against the death penalty for the crime in the civilian 
context and that the penalty here is unconstitutional. The laws of 
the separate States, which have responsibility for the administration 
of the criminal law for their civilian populations, are entitled to 
considerable weight over and above the punishments Congress and 
the President consider appropriate in the military context. The 
more relevant federal benchmark is federal criminal law that applies 
to civilians, and that law does not permit the death penalty for child 
rape.71 
As a result, the Court seemed to suggest that had there been 
evidence of a federal civilian statute authorizing the death penalty for 
child rape, the outcome in Kennedy might have been different.72 
Due to the Court’s denial of the petition for rehearing, Richard 
M. Ré and others have argued that the Kennedy holding was 
grounded primarily on a national consensus rationale.73 Because of 
 
 68. Id. at 421. 
 69. 10 U.S.C. § 856 (2006). 
 70. See Petition for Rehearing, Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641 (No. 07-343), 
2008 WL 2847069; see also Ré, supra note 20, at 1034 n.8. 
 71. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 945, 948 (2008) (Kennedy, J., statement 
concerning the denial of rehearing). 
 72. Ré, supra note 20, at 1035 (“The Kennedy rehearing decision thus acknowledged 
that newly discovered evidence of a preexisting civilian statute might have prompted the Court 
to reconsider its decision . . . .”). 
 73. See id. at 1034–36. In addition, another scholar has also argued that “the Court’s 
analysis [in Kennedy] leaves no doubt that it would not have invalidated the death penalty in 
these cases without the ‘indicia of consensus’ and evidence of the trends in opinion.” Strauss, 
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this, these scholars have argued that Kennedy is and should be 
susceptible to federal legislative override, since its rationale was 
contingent upon national legislative practices.74 More specifically, Ré 
argues that Kennedy should be subject to nonamendment federal 
legislative override, since new federal legislation would indicate an 
alternative national consensus from the one that the Court originally 
found.75 
While Ré’s argument focuses only on the susceptibility of 
Kennedy to legislative override, his argument has broader 
significance. Ré’s argument suggests one way that the Court might 
approach a case in which its national consensus and independent 
judgment analyses diverge. While the two rationales in the Kennedy 
opinion supported the same outcome, this will not be true in every 
case. Ré suggests that if the Court chooses to adopt a national 
consensus rationale as its primary method of analysis, perhaps when 
that rationale differs from the independent judgment-based analysis, 
then subsequent Eighth Amendment cases would indeed become 
susceptible to nonamendment legislative override. After all, because 
the Court has determined that legislation is the most reliable 
indicator of public attitudes,76 new federal legislative sentencing 
practices would seem to indicate a change in national consensus.77As 
a result, Ré and others have pointed out that Kennedy represents a 
case where the national consensus rationale actually took primacy 
over the Court’s independent judgment. 
 
supra note 20, at 867. 
 74. Ré, supra note 20, at 1035–36; see also Ré, supra note 22, at 367. More precisely 
however, Ré argues that federal legislation is a better indicator of national attitudes on 
sentencing practices than other sources of legislation. Ré, supra note 20, at 1046–50. 
 75. Ré, supra note 20, at 1038–39. It is at least doubtful that the Court’s sole or 
primary reasoning for declining a rehearing for its holding in Kennedy was the national 
consensus analysis. Instead, it is more likely that the Court was simply attempting to dispose of 
the petition for rehearing in the most efficient way possible, by directly negating the argument 
put forth by the petitioners. By directly negating the petitioners’ claims and arguing that a 
national consensus did not exist, the Court was simply responding to the argument in the most 
efficient way possible. Ré seems to read too much into the Kennedy majority’s failure to 
mention its independent judgment rationale, as that omission in no way suggests that the 
Court was retreating from the plain language of its opinion. That opinion clearly grounded the 
Kennedy holding on both national consensus and independent judgment reasoning. 
 76. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312 (2002). 
 77. Ré, supra note 20, at 1046–50. See also Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312 (quoting Penry v. 
Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989)) (“We have pinpointed that the ‘clearest and most 
reliable objective evidence of contemporary values is the legislation enacted by the country’s 
legislatures.’”). 
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C. Tensions Continue: The Arguable Primacy of the Independent 
Judgment Rationale in Graham v. Florida 
In 2010, the Court arguably reversed the national consensus-
based approach it took in denying the rehearing for Kennedy by 
favoring the independent judgment approach.78 In Graham v. 
Florida, the Court first applied the categorical approach to a 
noncapital case. In that case, a juvenile defendant had been given a 
life sentence without the possibility of parole for committing 
nonhomicidal crimes.79 The Court held that such a sentence is 
prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.80 More importantly, the 
Court seemed to “tweak” the national consensus analysis in light of 
its independent judgment rationale, as the two rationales had 
pointed in seemingly different directions. 
In applying its independent judgment analysis, the Court 
considered a variety of factors, including: (1) the culpability of 
juvenile offenders, (2) the nature of the offense committed, (3) the 
severity of the punishment at issue, and (4) whether the practice 
“serves legitimate penological goals.”81 In considering these factors, 
the Court argued that its independent judgment weighed against 
permitting Florida to sentence nonhomicidal juvenile offenders to 
life imprisonment without a meaningful chance for parole.82 This was 
mostly because the immaturity and youth of juvenile offenders cause 
them to have less culpability than the average offender and because 
nonhomicidal crimes do not warrant the most severe noncapital 
penalty.83 
 
 78. This is arguable, however, since the Court formally, although perhaps not 
substantively, grounded its decision on both a national consensus and independent judgment 
rationale. See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2022–34 (2010). 
 79. Id. at 2020. 
 80. Id. at 2034. 
 81. Id. at 2026. 
 82. See id. at 2026–30. 
 83. See id. First, the Court found that juveniles have less culpability because of their 
immaturity and youth. Id. at 2026–27. Second, the Court found that offenders who do not 
commit or intend to commit homicide are “less deserving of the most serious forms of 
punishment than are murderers.” Id. at 2027. Third, the Court recognized that a life sentence 
without parole is the “second most severe penalty permitted by law” and therefore is only 
proper in the most serious of circumstances. Id. (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 
957, 1001 (1991)). Last, the Court found that because nonhomicide juvenile offenders have 
diminished culpability due to their youth and nonhomicidal offenses, penological theories of 
punishment do not support giving them such a severe sentence. See id. at 2028–30. The Court 
essentially argued that because juveniles are less mature, less rational, and do not commit 
crimes involving homicide, none of the four traditional penological theories support 
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In applying the national consensus analysis, however, the Court 
modified its conventional approach, seemingly in an effort to make 
its results consistent with its independent judgment analysis. The 
Court found that thirty-seven states, the District of Columbia, and 
the federal government all permitted sentencing juveniles to life 
imprisonment for nonhomicide offenses.84 By contrast, only thirteen 
states did not permit these practices.85 
Remarkably, the Court seemed to dismiss these statistics, and 
instead shifted its focus to the country’s actual sentencing 
practices.86 Whereas actual sentencing practices had previously served 
only a supplementary role in the national consensus approach,87 the 
Court utilized this factor in Graham as the primary basis for its 
national consensus finding. Specifically, the Court found that only 
123 juvenile offenders around the country were serving life sentences 
without parole for nonhomicide crimes.88 Importantly, all of those 
offenders were convicted in only eleven states, with well over half of 
them being sentenced in Florida alone.89 Thus, the Court 
determined that because only eleven jurisdictions actually imposed 
life sentences without parole on nonhomicidal juvenile offenders,90 a 
national consensus existed against the practice, despite the 
overwhelming amount of legislation that authorized it.91 
Overall, then, the Graham Court had difficulty in reaching a 
single and consistent outcome utilizing two separate rationales. 
While the Court in Graham did not explicitly find that its national 
consensus and independent judgment rationales led to different 
results, Graham did demonstrate the potential conflict that can arise 
between using two separate rationales to determine a single holding. 
 
incarcerating them for life. See id. at 2028–30. 
 84. Id. at 2023. 
 85. Id. 
 86. See id. 
 87. See supra Part II.A. 
 88. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2024. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 2026. The Court noted that although the number of juveniles serving such 
sentences is not small, “the comparison suggests that in proportion to the opportunities for its 
imposition, life without parole sentences for juveniles convicted of nonhomicide crimes is as 
rare as other sentencing practices found to be cruel and unusual.” Id. at 2025. Interestingly, 
the Court also considered the fact that there was an international consensus against the 
sentencing practice. Id. at 2033. In this, the Court noted that only eleven nations permitted 
imposition of a life sentence without parole for a juvenile offender, and only two of those 
nations, including the United States, ever imposed such a sentence. Id. 
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In order to arrive at a coherent result, the Graham Court was forced 
to “tweak” its traditional national-consensus approach to harmonize 
it with the independent-judgment analysis. As a result, both Kennedy 
and Graham illustrate that the Court’s categorical approach for 
Eighth Amendment proportionality review is currently in a state of 
tension.92 While previous cases demonstrated that the national-
consensus and independent-judgment rationales can often be utilized 
in complementary fashion, Kennedy and Graham demonstrate that 
tension between the two rationales is inevitable at some point. 
Indeed, it is likely that the Court will eventually encounter a case in 
which the two rationales will lead to such different results that no 
amount of “tweaking” will be able to reconcile the two 
methodologies. 
As a result, the Court will eventually be forced to choose which 
one of the two rationales should take primacy in Eighth Amendment 
categorical review. While Richard Ré and other scholars have implied 
that adopting a national-consensus-only approach is a legitimate and 
perhaps desirable option,93 this Comment argues that such an 
approach is highly problematic. 
III. A PRIMARILY-NATIONAL-CONSENSUS APPROACH UNDERMINES 
THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT POLICY OF LIMITING LEGISLATIVE 
ACTION  
A primarily-national-consensus approach for Eighth Amendment 
categorical review would undermine major policies embedded within 
the Eighth Amendment and the Constitution generally. Primarily, 
this approach would undermine the Eighth Amendment’s general 
purpose of imposing limits on legislative action.94 This is because, 
were the Court to adopt a national consensus-only approach, the 
Eighth Amendment would fail to limit legislative action as it would 
become a grant of legislative authority. This would undermine the 
more fundamental policy of protecting politically weak minorities 
from unbridled majority action, a central purpose underlying the 
Eighth Amendment and the Bill of Rights generally.95 
As the Court has noted numerous times, the primary intent 
 
 92. See Ré, supra note 22, at 371 (noting that “Graham demonstrates that the Supreme 
Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence is in a state of flux”). 
 93. Ré, supra note 20, at 1036; Strauss, supra note 20, at 868. 
 94. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
 95. See infra Part III.B. 
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behind constitutionalizing the prohibitions in the Eighth 
Amendment was to place an absolute limit on what kinds of 
sentencing practices legislatures can authorize.96 In other words, the 
role of the Eighth Amendment is to act as an outer limit on what 
kinds of punishments legislatures can impose on criminal offenders. 
[W]hile the opinions of legislatures [may] be given great weight 
when assessing the constitutionality of a penalty, their opinions 
[will] not, and [can] not, be conclusive. Otherwise, the Cruel and 
Unusual Punishment Clause would have no meaning, because its 
very purpose is to guard against the penchant of legislatures to 
overreact sometimes to the problem of crime . . . .97 
Thus, because “the Eighth Amendment is a restraint upon the 
exercise of legislative power[,] . . . there are punishments that the 
Amendment would bar whether legislatively approved or not.”98 
 
Consequently, if a national consensus rationale is utilized as the 
sole or primary basis for determining the content of the Eighth 
Amendment, then the role of that constitutional provision as a limit 
on legislative power is undermined. As Ré and other scholars have 
pointed out, if a national consensus approach were utilized as the 
primary rationale in Eighth Amendment categorical review, then 
Eighth Amendment rights could be dictated by the sentencing 
practices of federal or state legislators.99 This would mean that the 
Eighth Amendment could not limit the discretion of legislatures in 
any meaningful way, and the provision would constitute an empty 
promise. Instead, all that would limit the power of legislatures is 
whether the sentencing practice is adopted nationally. As Ré argues, 
this would mean that any sentencing practice passed by Congress 
would by definition satisfy Eighth Amendment review.100 As a result, 
a national consensus-based approach would render the Eighth 
Amendment’s “limits” without substantive meaning, as it would 
deprive the provision of its binding power on legislative action. 
 
 96. See, e.g., Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 33 (2003) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(stating that the Eighth Amendment imposes “outer limits” on the sentencing authority of 
legislatures). 
 97. BRANHAM, supra note 9, at 146 (emphasis added) (describing the Court’s analysis 
in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976)). 
 98. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 174 (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 313–14 (1972) 
(White, J., concurring)). 
 99. Ré, supra note 20, at 1036; Strauss, supra note 20, at 868. 
 100. Ré, supra note 20, at 1036. 
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Interestingly, if a national-consensus-only approach were 
adopted, rather than acting as a limit on legislative authority, the 
amendment would seemingly constitute a grant of authority to 
legislatures. As stated, so long as a particular legislative practice could 
garner widespread use, legislatures could engage in whatever 
sentencing practices they deem appropriate. This result would not 
only controvert the original intent behind the Eighth Amendment, 
but also the dual nature of the categorical analysis approach. It was 
because the Court could not trust the political process to treat 
criminal offenders fairly that it insisted on implementing an 
independent-judgment rationale in the first place. 101 By utilizing 
that analysis, the Court could determine “whether there is reason to 
disagree with the judgment reached by the citizenry and its 
legislators.”102 
In addition, a national-consensus-only approach would have the 
secondary effect of circumventing the amendment process as set 
forth in Article V of the Constitution. The Court has noted that the 
Eighth Amendment is intended to “shut off” the people’s ability “to 
express their preference through the normal democratic 
processes.”103 In other words, the Eighth Amendment prevents 
legislatures or political majorities from adopting certain sentencing 
practices regardless of whether they could be approved by normal 
legislative procedures. This is grounded in a mistrust of the political 
process to adequately protect criminal offenders.104 However, a 
national-consensus-only approach would undermine this policy, 
because Congress could undercut previously recognized Eighth 
Amendment rights by a simple majority vote rather than through a 
vote of two-thirds in both houses and by three-fourths of the states, 
as required by Article V.105 
“[T]he Eighth Amendment demands more than that a 
challenged punishment be acceptable to contemporary society.”106 It 
also requires that a punishment be consistent with the original 
purposes behind the amendment itself.107 This is true not merely 
because of concerns for stare decisis, but because the core 
 
 101. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 313 (2002). 
 102. Id. 
 103. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 176. 
 104. See id. 
 105. U.S. CONST. art. V. 
 106. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 182. 
 107. Id. 
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constitutional policies and purposes that ground the Eighth 
Amendment demand that a nonpolitical limit be placed on what 
state or federal legislatures may do to criminal offenders. Because the 
Eighth Amendment is intended to constitute an outer limit on the 
sentencing authority of legislatures, a national-consensus-only 
approach would undermine the Eighth Amendment itself. 
Because of this, a national consensus-based approach would fail 
to account for the more fundamental policy of adequately protecting 
a politically weak minority from unbridled majority rule. The 
protection of politically weak minorities is implicit not only in the 
Eighth Amendment’s language relating to criminal offenders, but 
also in the Bill of Rights and Constitution generally.108 It is clear that 
the reasoning requiring certain protections for criminals under the 
Eighth Amendment stemmed from the recognition that criminal 
offenders constitute a minority class of citizens that will rarely, if 
ever, be able to garner enough political support to sufficiently check 
the actions of legislatures that affect them. Indeed, because convicted 
criminals are a particularly unsympathetic minority, they are highly 
vulnerable to the whims of outraged majorities. As stated by the 
Court, it is a “well-known fact that anticrime legislation is far more 
popular than legislation providing protections for persons guilty of 
violent crime.”109 No doubt this is because popular opinion has 
been, and likely will continue to be, unsympathetic to convicted 
criminals. 
While some antagonism towards these offenders is warranted, the 
potential for outraged political majorities to excessively punish them 
was anticipated by the Framers.110 As a result, the Eighth 
Amendment was included as an indicator of the founders’ mistrust of 
political majorities to deal fairly with criminal offenders.111 Indeed, 
this point was implicit in Roper, in which the Court acknowledged 
that society is often willing to overlook just punishment in order to 
 
 108. Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1132 
(1991) (noting that one of the several purposes of the Bill of Rights was to “vest individuals 
and minorities with substantive rights against popular majorities”). See also THE FEDERALIST 
NO. 51, at 357–58 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (stating that the 
Constitution was not only to “guard the society against the oppression of its rulers, but [also] 
to guard one part of the society against the injustice of the other part”). 
 109. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 315 (2002). 
 110. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3125 (2010) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (noting that the Eighth Amendment seeks “to protect individuals who might 
otherwise suffer unfair or inhumane treatment at the hands of a majority”). 
 111. See id. 
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satisfy outraged majorities.112 
As a result, it can be argued that the Eighth Amendment was 
included in the Bill of Rights specifically because criminal offenders 
were a particularly vulnerable political minority that could not be 
adequately protected by the normal political process. Consequently, 
if a national-consensus-based approach is used to construe the limits 
of the Eighth Amendment, there would be no mechanism that could 
effectively limit majority action aimed at excessive punishments. 
Protection for this minority would ironically be sacrificed by the very 
Amendment intended to protect that group. 
Furthermore, use of the national-consensus rationale is itself 
based upon questionable reasoning. Historically, the rationale for 
using a national consensus or “evolving standards of decency” 
approach has been based upon the assumption that American society 
is “progressive” in regards to its moral development.113 As stated, the 
Court declared early on that the “evolving standards of decency” by 
which the Eighth Amendment is measured are rooted in “the 
progress of a maturing society.”114 In other words, the Eighth 
Amendment “acquire[s] meaning as public opinion becomes 
enlightened by a humane justice.”115 
Unfortunately, the assumption that society’s sense of fairness 
progresses with time, at least with regards to the punishment of 
criminal offenders, is not entirely accurate. As the Court itself has 
more recently recognized, legislatures are often overeager to harshly 
punish criminal offenders because that is often more attractive to 
political majorities.116 Likewise, as the Court implied in Roper, 
because society is often more concerned with punishment than 
fairness, it often tends to forget about ensuring that criminal 
offenders are not excessively punished.117 As a result, it is rather 
questionable that society’s sense of fairness with regards to criminal 
offenders can be understood as truly “progressive.” A national 
 
 112. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573 (2005) (stating that the public would 
likely react impulsively to brutal criminal conduct in a way that overlooks important mitigating 
factors, such as an offender’s youth, immaturity, and overall lessened culpability). 
 113. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion). 
 114. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (quoting Trop, 356 U.S. at 101). 
 115. Id. at 171 (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910)). 
 116. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 315 (2002) (“[It is a] well-known fact that 
anticrime legislation is far more popular than legislation providing protections for persons 
guilty of violent crime.”). 
 117. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 573. 
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consensus-only approach would therefore be a difficult one to justify 
in light of the Eighth Amendment’s policy of imposing an outer 
limit on acceptable punishments. 
Overall, these criticisms do not necessarily mean that a national 
consensus analysis can never be relevant to Eighth Amendment 
review. Indeed, the Court has consistently and legitimately 
interpreted the Amendment through “evolving standards of 
decency.”118 All this Comment argues against is a type of Eighth 
Amendment review that utilizes national consensus as the sole or 
primary methodology. If this occurs, the Amendment loses its 
limiting character on legislative action therefore fails to protect the 
politically weak minority that the Amendment explicitly anticipates 
protecting. 
 
IV. RESOLVING THE CATEGORICAL REVIEW DILEMMA: THE 
PRIMACY OF INDEPENDENT JUDGMENT 
As demonstrated, there are significant problems that accompany 
a national-consensus-based rationale for Eighth Amendment 
categorical review. This Comment proposes that the Court can 
resolve this dilemma by utilizing the independent-judgment rationale 
as the primary methodology for Eighth Amendment categorical 
review. In this, the national-consensus rationale, while relevant, 
should be secondary to the Court’s independent-judgment analysis. 
This proposed solution would require focusing primarily on the 
common sense principles and penological theories inherent in the 
Court’s Eighth Amendment precedents.119 For example, in order to 
formulate bright-line rules that determine a particular sentence’s 
constitutionality, the Court could use the criteria specified in 
Graham. This would involve the Court evaluating (1) the culpability 
of the offender, (2) the nature of the offense committed, (3) the 
severity of the punishment at issue, and (4) whether the practice 
“serves legitimate penological goals.”120 For this last criterion, the 
Court could assess the legitimacy of the sentencing practice by 
considering how well the sentence rationally serves the penological 
 
 118. See, e.g., Trop, 356 U.S. at 101. 
 119. For example, in Atkins, Roper, Kennedy, and Graham, the Court was able to 
identify common-sense principles from which they could derive bright-line rules that would 
inform the limits of the Eighth Amendment. See supra Part II.A–C. 
 120. See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026 (2010). 
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theories of retribution, deterrence, and rehabilitation, just as it did in 
Graham. While use of these factors involves a subjective judgment, 
this problem arises with any judicial test not grounded in statistical 
data. By looking to these criteria, however, the Court would be able 
to formulate the bright-line rules that inform the limits of the Eighth 
Amendment. 
Furthermore, this methodology would render the national-
consensus inquiry a relevant, but ultimately less important, inquiry. 
The role of the national-consensus analysis in Eighth Amendment 
review would merely serve as a “trigger” to prompt the Court to 
look for common-sense principles that support the widely held views 
embodied in legislative sentencing schemes. This adjustment would 
place the national-consensus analysis in its most fitting position 
because it indicates only what practices are widely used, not why they 
should be permissible. All statistics can demonstrate is that a majority 
of people support or oppose a particular sentencing practice. As a 
result, while use of a national-consensus-only approach could 
demonstrate that a particular punishment is or is not “unusual,” it 
could not explain whether or why it is or is not “cruel.” 
An independent-judgment analysis, however, does give reasons as 
to why a particular sentencing practice is or is not constitutional, 
because that approach is made up of common sense principles that 
are aimed at explaining why a sentence is permissible or not. Indeed, 
this is why the Court has previously intimated that the independent-
judgment approach is the superior approach, because it helps 
determine whether “there is reason to disagree with the judgment 
reached by the citizenry and its legislators.”121 Furthermore, because 
the Court is more insulated from the pressure of outraged majorities 
than the legislators who are elected by them, the Court can more 
adequately serve the policies underlying the Eighth Amendment, as 
discussed in the previous section. 
Thus, the Court should combine the national-consensus and 
independent-judgment analyses into a single approach in which the 
Court’s own independent judgment analysis would form the primary 
basis of Eighth Amendment review. This would consist of the Court 
taking into consideration all of the Graham factors in order to 
formulate bright-line rules that inform the limits of the Eighth 
Amendment. In addition, the function of the national-consensus 
rationale would be of only secondary importance, as it could merely 
 
 121. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 313. 
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prompt the Court to look at the fairness underlying a widely used 
sentencing practice. This approach would not only prevent legislative 
determination of the content of the Eighth Amendment, but it 
would make the Court’s analysis more internally coherent, as well as 
more consistent with the major constitutional policies noted above. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The categorical approach to Eighth Amendment review is 
currently in a state of tension. In previous cases, the Court has 
construed the outer limits of sentencing authority embodied in the 
Eighth Amendment by utilizing a dual-analytical approach that sees 
the national-consensus and independent-judgment rationales as 
coequal.122 While the Court has been able to utilize these two 
methodologies in complementary fashion throughout the twentieth 
century, this will not always be true. At some point, using two 
separate rationales will inevitably lead to divergent results, prompting 
the Court to modify its approach. 
Some scholars have suggested that a national-consensus-only 
approach that leaves Eighth Amendment rules susceptible to 
legislative override is a legitimate solution to this dilemma.123 By 
using an Eighth Amendment review that is grounded primarily in a 
national consensus approach, the test for constitutional muster of 
any sentence would be merely whether it is nationally used or 
consented to. In this way, Congress could determine for itself 
whether a particular criminal sentence is constitutional or not. In 
other words, Congress could change the rules of Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence without even having to pass an amendment to the 
Constitution. 
This Comment argues that a national-consensus-only approach is 
problematic. Such an approach cuts against the major Eighth 
Amendment policy of imposing limits on legislative authority, which 
derives from the recognition that political majorities cannot always 
be trusted to deal fairly with criminal offenders. Instead, the Court 
should adopt an independent-judgment-based rationale that would 
render the national-consensus inquiry of secondary importance. This 
approach would consist of the Court utilizing the basic principles 
and criteria inherent in its precedents, including Graham, in order to 
 
 122. See supra Part II. 
 123. See supra Part II.B. 
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formulate the bright-line rules for its categorical approach. This 
method would not only avoid the constitutional problems noted 
above, but it would best serve the core policies underlying the 
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against “cruel and unusual 
punishments.”124 
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